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Resumo
Os livros de Raymond Aron apresentam-se como
um exemplo de um julgamento político lúcido
numa época de extremos em que muitos intelec-
tuais se afastaram da moderação e foram atraí-
dos para várias formas de metafísicas irrespon-
sáveis e de radicalismo político. Extraindo uma
selecção representativa dos escritos de Aron
que cobrem mais de três décadas da sua vida,
este paper concentra “no observador comprome-
tido” (spectateur engagé) a resposta de Aron
às metafísicas irresponsáveis. Eu também apre-
sento e comento as opiniões de Aron acerca do
papel, virtudes, limites, e possibilidade de mo-
deração na vida política. Embora Aron jogasse
brilhantemente o papel do ”observador com-
prometido”, nunca deu uma indicação teórica
clara acerca deste tema. Consequentemente, é
preciso reconstruir o retrato intelectual do ob-
servador comprometido, peça a peça, usando
introspecções dispersas dos livros de Aron em
que ele descreveu o seu próprio compromisso
político no contraste com o compromisso
de pessoas como Sartre, Althusser e Merleau-
-Ponty.
Abstract
Raymond Aron’s books stand out as an example of
lucid political judgment in an age of extremes in
which many intellectuals shunned moderation and
were attracted to various forms of irresponsible
metaphysics and political radicalism. By drawing on
a representative selection from Aron’s writings
covering more than three decades of his life, this
paper concentrates on the “committed observer”
(spectateur engagé) as Aron’s response to
irresponsible metaphysics. I also present and
comment on Aron’s views on the role, virtues, limits,
and possibility of moderation in political life.
Although Aron brilliantly played the role of the
“committed observer,” he never gave a clear
theoretical statement on this issue. Therefore one has
to reconstruct the intellectual portrait of the
committed observer piece by piece by using scattered
insights from Aron’s own books in which he described
his own political engagement in contrast with the
engagement of people like Sartre, Althusser, and
Merleau-Ponty.
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“Let us pray for the arrival of the skeptics so that they may
extinguish fanaticism” (Raymond Aron)
Raymond Aron’s books stand out as examples of lucid political judgment in an age
of extremes in which many intellectuals shunned moderation and were attracted to
various forms of radicalism and irresponsible metaphysics. As an engaged spectator
raised in the tradition of Cartesian rationalism, Aron (1905-1983) produced an
impressive body of writings that include not only sophisticated reflections on abstract
topics such as philosophy of history, the philosophical underpinnings of modernity,
and the virtues and limitations of liberal democracy, but also systematic and
well-informed commentaries on concrete issues such as the war in Algeria, the
student’s revolt of May 1968, American foreign policy, and the Soviet Union. Aron’s
most important works, in particular Peace and War, The Opium of the Intellectuals, Main
Currents of Sociological Thought, Essays on Liberties, and Clausewitz, along with his
writings on Marx and his followers, shaped the intellectual climate in France and
gained wide recognition in the United States five decades ago or so. It is important to
remember that Aron was one of the few Frenchmen who really understood and
appreciated America and never succumbed to the temptation of anti-Americanism
that has always loomed large in France1.
In this essay I comment on Aron’s political moderation in contrast to the immoderate
political agenda of radical spirits such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Althusser.
After offering an overview of the main themes of Aron’s works that relate to the
issue of moderation2, I turn to the metaphor of the committed observer (spectateur
engagé) that was central to Aron’s understanding of political judgment and
distinguished his political involvement from that of Sartre and his followers. If
Aron brilliantly played the role of a spectateur engagé for more than four decades,
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1 For an excellent intellectual portrait of Aron, see Pierre Manent’s essay “Raymond Aron – Political Educator,”
in Raymond Aron, In Defense of Liberal Reason, ed. Daniel J. Mahoney (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
1994), pp. 1-23. Raymond Aron’s memoirs are another key source of information for any interpreter of his
works.
2 For a detailed analysis of Aron’s political theory, see Daniel J. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of
Raymond Aron (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992); Nicolas Baverez, Raymond Aron (Paris: Flammarion,
1993); Stephen Launay, La pensée politique de Raymond Aron (Paris: PUF, 1995); Brian Anderson,
Raymond Aron: The Recovery of the Political (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). A discussion of Aron’s
“morality of prudence” can be found in Daniel J. Mahoney “Raymond Aron and the Morality of Prudence:
A Reconsideration,” Modern Age, 43 (2001): 243-52. Also worth consulting are the articles on Aron
published in Commentaire, 28-29 (1985) and European Journal of Political Theory, 2 (2003).
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he never gave a clear theoretical statement regarding the main characteristics of
the “committed observer.” Hence one has to reconstruct the portrait of the latter
piece by piece by using scattered insights from Aron’s own books in which he
described his own political engagement and reflected on the shortcomings of radical
forms of political engagement and irresponsible metaphysics.
None of Aron’s works seems better suited to this task than Le spectateur engagé
(recently reedited in the United States as Thinking Politically), featuring the dialogue
between Aron and two younger interlocutors, Dominique Yolton and Jean-Louis
Missika. Aron himself expressed a particular liking for this book that was favorably
received by the French press in the early 1980s3. In addition to this volume, I also use
Aron’s Memoirs, The Opium of the Intellectuals, and a few important essays such as
Fanaticism, Prudence, and Faith (republished as an appendix to the 2001 new English
edition of the Opium), “History and Politics,” and “Three Forms of Historical
Intelligibility.”
French liberalism: an oxymoron?
Arguably, the choice of a French author might surprise given the radical legacy
of the French Revolution and the high propensity to extremes displayed by the
French over the past three centuries. As Tocqueville once argued in The Old Regime
and the Revolution, France has always been – and, one might add, has remained to
this day – a country of paradoxes, “more capable of heroism than of virtue, of genius
than of common sense, ready to conceive vast plans rather than to complete great
tasks”4. What other country has simultaneously given the world the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and of Citizen and the Terror of 1793? What other country had
produced spirits as different as Descartes and Bossuet, Montaigne and Pascal, Rousseau
and Constant, Robespierre and Napoleon, Sartre and Aron? In all its incarnations,
3 For more details, see Baverez, Raymond Aron, pp. 496-500. For the English edition, see Raymond Aron,
Thinking Politically, eds. Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian Anderson (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1997). In commenting on the intellectual profile of the committed observer, I espouse an approach similar
to the one used by Michael Oakeshott in his posthumously published book, The Politics of Faith and the
Politics of Skepticism (1996), in which the issues of moderation and political judgment occupy a central
place.
4 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, edited by François Furet and Françoise Mélonio,
trans. Alan S. Kahan, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 246.
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France emerged as “the most brilliant and dangerous nation of Europe, and the
best suited to become by turns an object of admiration, of hatred, of pity, and of
terror, but never of indifference”5.
“I have never met a Frenchman who was a liberal,” the literary critic Émile Faguet
once argued. What seems today to be a mere boutade was a commonplace in France a
century ago. On both the left and the right, liberal principles were rejected as
inadequate or hypocritical, and liberalism was seen as a mere oxymoron or an exotic
eccentricity. This attitude has deep roots in French political culture. For example, in
the 1830s, Tocqueville declared himself a “liberal of a new kind” and claimed at the
same time that the liberal party to which he belonged... did not exist. Much has
changed in France in the last three decades of the twentieth century. As a result of a
velvet revolution, liberalism became almost overnight a fashionable political ideology,
signaling a momentous intellectual change. Leading French political philosophers,
historians, and sociologists such as Raymond Aron, François Furet, Pierre Rosanvallon,
and Pierre Manent, began drawing upon a rich tradition of nineteenth-century French
political thought that had either been ignored or systematically distorted by
unsympathetic commentators. Thus France eventually managed to exorcise the specter
of its illiberal past and its intellectuals, who once believed that Marxism was the
unsurpassable horizon of our times, came to defend traditional liberal values and
liberal institutions. The last three decades marked the end of a long tradition of
political illiberalism and the birth of a “centrist republic” (Furet).
Nonetheless, in spite if this liberal Renaissance, French liberalism has not
fully shed away some of its peculiar features that have made it different from its
counterpart across the Channel or the Ocean. The complex legacy of the French
Revolution and its internal contradictions explain why French liberals grappled with
a particular set of issues and why their solutions were often found to be unorthodox
and unconventional when compared to those advanced by English liberals across the
Channel or American thinkers. It has been noted that in France, liberal principles such
as limited power and the rights of man were rooted in its moment of origin and
associated with the “movement of rage” of 1789. While the ideas of French thinkers
were reputed for their rich theoretical imagination, their political theories were
often found wanting by more pragmatic spirits, concerned with the practical
implications of ideas and principles. French ideas and slogans such as the famous
5 Tocqueville, The Old Regime, p. 247.
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Liberté, Fraternité, Égalité were bold and marvelous creations of the human mind, but
they were often used to legitimize political regimes which proved to be inimical to
individual freedom and happiness. Too often, French thinkers forsake moderation
and opted instead for various forms of radicalism that shunned prudence and
displayed a disquieting propensity for excess and radical perfectionism. Where
are, one might rhetorically ask, the French equivalents of Benjamin Franklin,
George Washington, or James Madison?
As Edouard Laboulaye, a leading nineteenth-century French liberal, once
acknowledged, the taste for logic and perfectionism had always characterized French
political culture. “We easily go to extremes and thus risk missing the goal. We had
more than one opportunity to regret not having held to a juste milieu”6. French
intellectuals put a great emphasis on style and form and paid special attention to the
rhetoric of their discourses. A seventeenth-century writer, Béat-Louis de Muralt,
candidly acknowledged: “Style, whatever it expresses, is an important thing in
France. Elsewhere, expressions are born of thoughts …, here it is the reverse; often it
is the expressions that give birth to thoughts”7. A century later, Tocqueville conveyed
a similar idea in his Recollections, in which he argued that the French display an
unusual propensity for radicalism by looking for “what is novel and ingenuous rather
than for what is true; in preferring the showy to the useful; in showing one’s self very
sensible to the playing and elocution of the actors without regard to the results of the
play; and, lastly, in judging by impressions rather than reasons”8.
Time has proved Tocqueville right again and again. In the last century, disenchanted
with the “decadent” bourgeois world in which they lived, and thirsting for new certainties
that were expected to free them from the shackles of the “inhuman” capitalist world,
French intellectuals often indulged in vitriolic critiques of Western liberal democratic
regimes and exaggerated the accomplishments of Soviet-style communism. Of course,
none of the bien-pensant intellectuals moved permanently to Moscow or Beijing to
enjoy “live” the marvelous accomplishment of the “actually existent communism.”
6 Eduard Laboulaye, “Introduction,” in Benjamin Constant, Cours de politique constitutionnelle, ed.
E. Laboulaye. Paris: Guillaumin, 1861, p. xlvi.
7 Béat-Louis de Muralt as quoted by Tony Judt Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956. Berkeley:
University of California Press 1992, pp. 248-49. The reader will find a comprehensive discussion of the
limitations and virtues of French intellectuals in Judt, pp. 229-74 and Judt, The Burden of Responsibility:
Blum, Camus, Aron and the French Twentieth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998, pp. 3-27.
8 Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections, trans. A. Teixeira de Mattos. New York: Meridian, 1959, p. 70.
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Instead, they continued to enjoy their leisure in Paris, spent long hours chatting in
the pleasant cafés on Boulevard Saint-Michel, and paid occasional visits to their heroes
in the East when they became bored by the “unbearable lightness of being” in the decadent
capitalist world.
Tony Judt once claimed that France lacks blocks of a genuine liberal political
vision such as the emphasis on individual rights or the separation between the
public and private sphere. French thinkers often succumbed to the seductions of
civic virtue, civic duties, and statism. As Judt argued, the language of rights underwent
an important conceptual transformation. From a protective device designed to
defend individuals against the encroachment of state institutions it evolved into
the basis for justifying the claims, actions, and whims of the authority against its
citizens. The enjoyment of civil liberties and rights was linked to the conservative
notion of social and political order. Thus abstract or natural rights were displaced
in favor of positive and concrete rights that could be forfeited in exceptional or
emergency situations. To speak of natural rights or rights against society or about
rights against the state interference was never a favorite topic in France. Moreover,
the French also displayed a strong propensity toward a strong executive power that
in turn engendered a particular type of liberalism through the state, not against
the state as in the Anglo-American liberal tradition. The habit of looking to the
state for assistance was accompanied by a nuanced form of skepticism toward
individualism and utilitarianism and a certain distrust of the market.
Finally, in his recent L’individu effacé ou le paradoxe du libéralisme français, Lucien
Jaume attributed the shortcomings of French liberalism to the alleged domination of
a statist type of liberalism over rights-based liberalism. “France,” Jaume argued, “did
not have a philosophic resource to think through a liberalism comparable to Locke in
England”9. French thinkers, Jaume concluded, were too often inclined to speculate on
concepts such as the sovereignty of reason or “gouvernabilité” and downplayed
equally important issues such as individual rights, the economic market, and the
separation of powers.
9 Lucien Jaume, L’individu effacé ou le paradoxe du libéralisme français. Paris: Fayard, 1997, p. 14.
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Aron’s political moderation
Appearances notwithstanding, the French political tradition offers an excellent
case-study to anyone interested in studying the virtues and limitations of political
moderation and the limits within which one can be at once an objective spectator and
an effective actor. It is precisely because France has had a long record of radicalism
in politics that it also developed a certain tradition of political moderation in response
to various forms of political extremism. As Ran Halévi demonstrated, moderation
became a mean of promoting courageous reforms in eighteenth-century France and
those who praised the English constitution used moderation and constitutionalism
as powerful tools for criticizing absolute monarchy of Louis XIV and his heirs10.
Raymond Aron’s unique intellectual trajectory illustrates both the virtues and
limitations of political moderation while his writings on the philosophy of history and
the relationship between history and politics are a gold mine for any student of
political judgment and phronesis 11. It is because he was so attentive to the specific
nature of the political that Aron understood what is so peculiar (and difficult) about
political judgment. In Aron’s view, there is no recipe for good political judgment.
Applying principles of rational analysis and logical inference from natural sciences
to politics amounts to a serious misunderstanding of the political sphere. In politics
it is highly important to know when to act and when to refrain from acting, along
with being able to perceive and understand novelty in history. Exceptional
circumstances do matter and human actions have many unintended consequences12.
Aron was both blessed and condemned to live in the “most brilliant and dangerous
nation of Europe” at a point in time when the survival of European civilization itself was
in doubt. In many ways, as Aron acknowledged in his memoirs, his writings contained the
10 Ran Halévi, ‘La modération à l’épreuve de l’absolutisme. De l’Ancien Régime à la Révolution française,”
Le Débat, No. 109, March-April 2000, p. 73.
11 I agree with Richard Ruderman that “prudence is not an altogether satisfactory translation of phronesis.”
While the latter suggests a certain pragmatic posture toward politics, it also has a qualitative component
that, according to Aristotle, allows one to live well. For more details, see Richard S. Ruderman, “Aristotle
and the Recovery of Political Judgment,” American Political Science Review, 91 (1997): 409ff.
12 In this regard, Aron followed in the footsteps of Guicciardini, although he was probably unaware of his
affinity with the Florentine historian and friend of Machiavelli. In his Ricordi, Guicciardini wrote that “if
you attempt certain things at the right time, they are easy to accomplish. … If you undertake them before
the time is right, not only will they fail, but they will often become impossible to accomplish even when the
time would have been right (Francesco Guicciardini, Maxims and Reflections [Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1972], p. 61).
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aspirations and doubts “that filled the consciousness of a man who was impregnated
by history”13. Aron’s career and writings teach us important lessons about a particular
face of moderation, the committed observer, whose values, choices, and predispositions
differ from those of the romantic intellectual eternally dissatisfied with the order of
things and always prone to be seduced by broad visions of the world.
At first sight, one might be tempted to say that the position of a committed observer
fits best what we usually call the public intellectual who lives half-way between the
ivory tower of academia and the bustling space of the agora. Or, it might be argued
that Aron’s committed observer bears striking similarities with Michael Walzer’s
connected social critic, in spite of their different political allegiances14 Aron was highly
skeptical of intellectuals rushing to get involved in politics or overzealous to comment
on political life. Based on his first-hand experience with his fellow French colleagues
who sought to mix Marxism and existentialism in order to create a new ethics of
authenticity, Aron argued that it is characteristic of intellectuals in general not to
seek to understand the social and political world, its institutions and practices.
Instead, what they most often want is to denounce the social and political order in
which they live because they feel overwhelmed by its complexity and murkiness.
Aron criticized this tendency of intellectuals to denounce too quickly the capitalist
civilization as excessively rationalistic and anti-heroic without attempting to
understand sine ira et studio the functioning of its institutions. He took to task those
who, without knowing the basics of economics and sociology, indulged in endless
diatribes against the rationalization of the soul and the (bourgeois) enthusiasm for
efficiency and productivity and pretended to offer a solution to the alienation of the
working classes15.
As Aron noted in The Opium of the Intellectuals, the limitations of industrial civilization,
the power of money, and the price of economic success tend to offend the susceptibilities
13 Raymond Aron, Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection, trans. George Holoch (New York: Holmes & Meier,
1990), p. 470.
14 See, for example, Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1987), pp. 38-40.
15 In this regard, Aron’s argument bears some affinities with Hayek’s or Nozick’s explanations for the
intellectuals’ general hostility to capitalism. In turn, Schumpeter pointed out that “Industrial and commercial
activity is essentially un-heroic in the knight’s sense – no flourishing of swords about it, not much physical
prowess, no chance to gallop the armored horse into the enemy, preferably a heretic or heathen – and the
ideology that glorifies the idea of fighting for fighting’s sake … withers in the office among all the columns
of figures” (Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [New York: Harper & Row, 1950],
pp. 127-28).
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of intellectuals who become over-emotional in preaching a strange form of intellectual
and political evangelism while claiming at the same time to be more competent
than ordinary citizens in judging the flaws of society16. Moreover, the obscurity and
compromise inherent in political life offend their aesthetic sensibilities, which can
hardly accept that the best is often the enemy of the better. Thus, intellectuals tend to
refuse to think politically and “prefer ideology, that is a rather literary image of a desirable
society, rather than to study the functioning of a given economy, of a parliamentary
system, and so forth”17. They prefer to eschew real political responsibility and come
to think that their only responsibility is to vituperate, being all too ready to leave the
other practical questions to the care of so-called experts whose language they often
do not understand and with whom they are not engaged in a sustained dialogue.
As a result, intellectuals tend to form opinions based on emotions and moral imperatives
rather than a careful analysis of each particular situation and often come to conceive
of their political engagement only (or primarily) as a pretext for self-aggrandizement.
Rediscovering the “political”
What is particularly remarkable in Aron’s works is his lucid and meticulous
analysis of the politically pernicious effects of the excess of speculative intelligence,
sometimes accompanied by a good dose of “irresponsible metaphysics,” that is often
the cause of immoderation and poor political judgment18. Three key principles
defined Aron’s political outlook. The first is the rejection of any dogmatic interpretation
of politics and society. As Aron wrote in his essay “Fanaticism, Prudence and Faith,”
any student of politics ought to take into account the plurality of considerations on
which political and economic actions depend. In so doing, he must be aware of
the inevitable conflict between ideas and principles such as economic growth and
equality of justice. Rather than seeking a fictitious harmonization between all
these values and principles, responsible politicians must achieve a reconciliation or
16 On this topic, see Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, eds. Daniel J. Mahoney & Brian Anderson
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 213-35.
17 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 154.
18 Chapter Four of Brian Anderson’s book is entitled “Antinomic Prudence” and offers a nuanced interpretation
of Aron’s political moderation (Raymond Aron, pp. 121-68). On this issue, also see Mahoney, The Liberal
Political Science of Raymond Aron, pp. 92, 111-28, 137-46.
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compromise between them and ought to be aware that this solution is only a temporary
one19. The second key principle is the rejection of any global determinism of history such
as Marxist historical materialism that deprives politics of its own autonomy. The third
principle concerns the conditions of political action as defined by choice and decision
in an environment that is in constant flux and is characterized by uncertainty.
What these principles have in common is the emphasis on the complex nature
of the “political,” that represents one of the most important contributions of Aron to
modern political thought. As already mentioned, Aron claimed that intellectuals tend
to distrust politics and often misunderstand or misrepresent the nature of the political
sphere. In The Opium of the Intellectuals, Aron made a seminal distinction between
three types of social criticism that have different agendas and philosophies. The first
type is “technical criticism” that suggests practical measures which seek to attenuate
the evils of society and regards its limitations as inevitable consequences and constraints
of political action. Different from technical criticism are two other types of criticism,
moral and ideological, which reject the present society in the name of an imaginary
society, whose contours remain after all fuzzy and imprecise20. Aron was skeptical toward
the last two forms of criticism because in his opinion, they tend to distort political
judgment. In his memoirs, Aron candidly acknowledged that he, too, had occasionally
practiced his own type of ideological criticism, albeit in a different manner than Sartre
and his followers. What Aron particularly disliked was the tendency to sketch out
a blueprint of a radically different order against which existing institutions are likely to
be found defective. In his view, this type of criticism was highly impressionistic
and lacked solid grounding in reality, as did utopian speculations and all forms of
“literary politics” that ignore reality, remain at the level of abstract theory, and end up by
misunderstanding the political.
In his essay “Three Forms of Historical Intelligibility,” Aron went to great length
to demonstrate the intrinsic shortcomings of all attempts to find higher forms of
intelligibility in history. Such endeavors, he wrote, are doomed to fail because most
political matters are uncertain and cannot be decided with the exactitude characteristic
of natural sciences. Aron criticized Hegel, Marx, and their followers for their
obsession with finding higher forms of intelligibility in history. Aron recognized,
however, that it is necessary and possible to search for distinct forms of historical
19 See, for example, Aron, “Fanaticism, Prudence, and Faith,” in The Opium of the Intellectuals, p. 346.
20 On this issue, see Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, pp. 210-12 and Aron, Memoirs, pp. 214-25.
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and political intelligibility that are derived from and linked to particular contexts. But
to speak of the “goal of History” as if one were endowed with a mystical vision
that would allow him to comprehend this historical totality from a privileged Archimedean
point makes little sense21. Moreover, this is a dangerous enterprise because it
might foster a particular form of fanaticism trying to justify the worst cruelties in the
name of noble ideals. Aron’s defense of “probabilistic determinism”22 was based on
his belief that, far from advancing inexorably toward a certain goal, the actual
development of history forces the responsible philosopher to take note of the plurality
of values and principles underlying human action as well as of the unique nature of
each political situation and context.
Aron made clear what the political analyst must take into account in order to
grasp the multifaceted nature of politics. This was precisely what the proponents
of various forms of political radicalism and irresponsible metaphysics refused to
do. To understand the forces at work in political life and be able to make informed
judgments, one must pay attention not only to structural factors that limit our freedom
but also to contingency and human nature. Here is a revealing passage that sheds
light on Aron’s understanding of the prerequisites of political judgment:
One must consider (1) the plurality of goals, from short-term to distant, from tactics
to strategy; (2) the actor’s knowledge of the situation, as well as the relative effectiveness
of means; … (3) the nature, lawful or unlawful, praiseworthy or not, of the end or
means in relation to religious, mythological, or traditional beliefs; and (4) the
duly psychological motivations of the act, which is sometimes appropriate but
sometimes apparently irrational with respect to the actor’s objective23.
In other words, one must take into account the plurality of goals and perspectives of
political actors and must seek to understand the functioning of political and economic
institutions such as Parliament, the market, interest groups, and political parties. In turn,
this requires an adequate perception of the wide range of available choices for reforming
these institutions.
21 In his essay “The Dawn of Universal History,” Aron wrote: “As for the philosophy of history, whether it
derives from Bossuet or Hegel, Marx or Toynbee, it is at best regarded more as a literary than a scientific
exercise, fit perhaps for writers but not for respectable thinkers” (Aron, “The Dawn of Universal History,”
in The Dawn of Universal History, [New York: Basic Books, 2002], p, 463).
22 Raymond Aron, Politics and History: Selected Essays, ed. and trans. Miriam B. Conant (New York: The Free
Press, 1978), p. 61.
23 Aron, Politics and History, pp. 48-49.
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While being aware of the importance of rational and scientific analysis, Aron
never went so far as to believe, like Hobbes and his contemporary followers, that a
political science more geometrico would ever be possible and desirable. Aron understood
that not all types of claims in political and social life can or must be demonstrated
and defended rationally24. Moreover, he always searched for the right tone for addressing
qualitatively different matters. For example, he insisted that analyzing economic
matters requires a different tone than writing about international relations. When
addressing economic issues, Aron sought to be clear and factual and avoided any
sentimental tone that would have been inappropriate. On political topics, he wrote
as a man who observed, reflected, and sought the best solution for the welfare of the
entire community. In the end, argued Aron, thinking politically amounts to making
a fundamental decision: “To think politically in a society, one must make a fundamental
choice. This fundamental choice is either the acceptance of the kind of society in which
we live, or its rejection. … From this fundamental choice flow decisions”25.
Aron’s politics of responsibility
Aron justified his allegiance to liberalism (in the European meaning of the term)
by resorting to a complex and nuanced sociological analysis of modern society that sought
to determine and evaluate critically the economic and social conditions that permit
freedom and pluralism to survive in modern society. In so doing, he spent a great deal
of time and energy studying various aspects of modern society: economics, social
relationships, class relationships, political systems, and relations among nations. He
rejected the once famous theory of the convergence of capitalism and communism and
believed that capitalist liberal societies could be peacefully reformed in spite of their
inherent shortcomings. It will be recalled that Aron wrote in his usually balanced,
non-partisan, and moderate style even when treating events that he disliked or disapproved
of or when he faced tragic events such as the Algerian crisis26. He was aware that anyone
24 For two interesting and well-informed perspectives on political judgment, see Peter Steinberger, The
Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 1-88, 281-304, and Ronald
Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 1-10, 129-67.
25 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 44.
26 One such example was the Vichy regime. While clearly rejecting the regime, Aron refused to think in
black-and-white terms when judging the degree of guilt of Marshal Pétain. This was certainly not a case of
moral indecision on Aron’s part; as both a Jew and a French citizen, he could have never endorsed a regime
that had in fact been imposed by the Nazis. For more details, see Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 82.
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who writes about political crises must always ask the fundamental question: “What
would I do if I were in the place of the statesman?”
Furthermore Aron believed that even in difficult times, one can (and ought to) be
committed to reason by upholding the idea of a decent society while also being fully
aware of the inherent imperfections and antinomies of our political and social world.
This idea was Raymond Aron’s guiding principle and pole-star. Although he lived
in dark times, Aron retained confidence in rational inquiry and the individuals’ ability
to see the difference between illusions, emotions, hopes, and demonstrable truths.
He refused to despair of any man, even though his century and contemporaries
gave him many reasons to despair27. “I was a disciple of Kant,” confessed Aron, “and
there is in Kant a concept to which I still subscribe: it is the idea of Reason, an image
of a society that would be truly humanized. We can continue to think, or dream or
hope – in the light of the idea of Reason – for a humanized society”28. Aron’s moderate
optimism rested on his awareness of the frailty and fallibility of human condition (did
not Kant, after all, speak about the crookedness of human nature?) as well as on
recognizing the concrete possibilities for effective and reasonable action in our
imperfect world.
While being fully committed to such principles as freedom, pluralism, and rule of
law, Aron opposed the dogmatic interpretation of these values and realized that the
endorsement of the principles underpinning Western liberal democratic societies was
not supposed to be a synonym for complacent conservatism. Although strongly opposed
to single-party rule and totalitarianism, Aron was never an ideologue of capitalism
like, say, Ayn Rand or Milton Friedman. “I have tried to serve the same values in
different circumstances and through different actions,” wrote Aron. “Having political
opinions is not a matter of having an ideology once and for all; it is a question of
taking the right decisions in changing circumstances”29. Our opinions must be based
on careful consideration of facts and should take into account the ways in which
changing circumstances affect our decisions, strategies, and goals.
His famous critique of freedom as negative liberty is a case in point. It will be
recalled that the concept of negative liberty was at the core of the theories of liberty
27 See ibid., p. 46.
28 Ibid., p. 263.
29 See Thinking Politically, p. 150; for more details on Aron’s method, also see pp. 201, 250. Another interesting
text is Aron’s essay, “History and Politics,” originally published in 1949 (an English translation can be found
in Aron, Politics and History, pp. 237-48).
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advanced by European Cold-war liberals such as Berlin, Popper, and Hayek. While
agreeing with their general political outlook, Aron did not shy away from showing
the inadequacies of the definition of liberty as freedom from interference as the
fundamental principle of liberal democratic society. At a point in time when the very
notion of citizenship was related to “positive” liberty, Aron who was no friend of
totalitarian systems, chose to affirm the importance of citizenship in modern society.
“Individuals in a democracy,” he argued, “are at once private persons and citizens. What
bothers me most is that it seems to me almost impossible in France to have courses
in citizenship in the schools. … Our societies, our democracies, are citizens’ countries”30.
It was this belief that led Aron to emphasize not only the centrality of mores to the
sustenance of liberal democracy (a lesson he learned from Tocqueville and Aristotle),
but also the need for a distinctive type of liberal civic education meant to cultivate
certain traits of character suitable to citizens living in modern liberal democracies31.
This view ran against the conception of freedom defended by another prominent
twentieth-century liberal and contemporary of Aron, Friedrich von Hayek, who in Aron’s
opinion, was a “doctrinaire” advocate of economic liberalism. In “Fanaticism, Prudence,
and Faith,” Aron defined “doctrinairism” as the tendency to attribute universal value to a
particular doctrine and considered as one of its manifestations the idea that the principles
of the ideal order are identical only with a certain set of institutions32. In his 1961 review
of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty, Aron put forward a different theory of freedom
that rejected the idea that a free society is defined only by free elections, the free
market, and the rule of law. Aron also believed that a moderate welfare state is not
incompatible with political freedom and the rule of law. He expressed reservation toward
that tradition of liberal thinking that equates liberty above all with obedience to laws
in order to reduce as much as possible the potentially arbitrary control exercised by
individuals over their fellow citizens. Liberty, affirmed Aron, depends on the universality
of the law, but it is also much more than absence of constraint: “All power involves
some element of the government of men by men; liberty is not adequately defined by
sole reference to the rule of law: the manner in which those who hold this power are
30 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 248.
31 On this issue, see Aron’s classic two-volume work Main Currents in Sociological Thought. A recent English
edition has been published by Transactions (1998, 1999).
32 See Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, pp. 332-34. A more elaborate treatment of this topic can be found
in chapter 2 (“Formal Freedoms and Real Freedoms”) of Aron’s An Essay on Freedom, tr. Helen Weaver
(Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 49-99.
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chosen, as well as the way in which they exercise it, are felt, in our day, as integral parts
of liberty”33. Liberty and power have a variable character that defines the adequate
and historically shifting limits of the individual sphere that must be protected against
the interference of the state. The upshot of this view is that there can be no objective,
eternally valid definition of constraint, and consequently of liberty, since general rules,
too, can sometimes be oppressive in one way or another. Aron believed that for all
the brilliance of his analysis, Hayek neglected this point when drawing a radical
distinction between obedience to persons (which he equated with unfreedom) and
submission to abstract and universal rules (which he equated with freedom)34. Interestingly,
a similar critique was advanced by Oakeshott, who wrote: “This is, perhaps, the main
significance of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom – not the cogency of his doctrine, but the fact
that it is a doctrine. A plan to resists all planning may be better than its opposite, but it
belongs to the same style of politics”35.
Aron’s middling, non-dogmatic position is also evidenced by his attitude toward
Marx, perhaps the most controversial modern thinker, capable of eliciting either
uncritical admiration or outright rejection. Aron carefully read all of Marx’s works, in
particular The Capital, which he regarded as one of the greatest sociological works ever
written. In this regard, it can be argued that Aron knew Marx much better than most of his
own critics on the Left, who often referred to Marx without having carefully studied his
works. Aron never converted to Marxism primarily because he understood early on the
internal contradictions of Marx’s economic, social, and political thought and could
not come up with a solution that would resolve these contradictions36. He saw Marxism
for what it was, that is a global interpretation of history predicated on two main ideas:
the preeminence of class struggle and priority of the relations of production compared
to the forces of production. Aron perceptively noted that from the materialistic
interpretation of history Marx drew a radical conclusion unsupported by logic or facts:
33 Aron, In Defense of Liberal Reason, p. 85; also see p. 83. For an interpretation of this topic, see Mahoney,
The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron, pp. 73-90.
34 On Aron’s attitude toward Hayek, see Mahoney The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron, pp. 87-88,
118-19.
35 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 2nd enlarged edition, ed. Timothy Fuller
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), p. 26; emphasis added.
36 For more details on this topic, see Raymond Aron, Le Marxisme de Marx, eds. Jean-Claude Cassanova and
Christian Bachelier (Paris: Fallois, 2002). Also see Aron’s analysis of the future of secular religions in Aron,
The Dawn of Universal History, pp. 177-202. For a detailed analysis of Aron’s critique of Marx, see
Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron, pp. 33-38, 74-80; Mahoney, “Aron, Marx, and
Marxism,” European Journal of Political Theory, 2 (2002): 415-27; and Anderson, Raymond Aron, pp. 61-87.
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that every progressive spirit must be on the side of the proletariat (the children of the
light) in the fight against the bourgeoisie (the children of darkness and forces of evil).
The endpoint of history, argued Marx, is socialism and one must embrace it to be on
the side of progress. Aron was uncomfortable with this (dogmatic) conclusion because
he saw in it a leap of faith that he was not able to make in spite of his appreciation for
Marx’ genius as a perceptive critic of nineteenth-century capitalism. “After having
studied Marxism for almost an entire year,” affirmed Aron, “I concluded with regret
that, in this form, it was not acceptable. The analysis of history does not permit one to
determine the policy to follow and to foresee, as an end result, a society from which
contradictions among men would be eliminated... Even today, I am interested in the
Marxism of Marx, but not in that of Brezhnev, which is very boring. But Marx’s Marxism
is very, very interesting”37.
The departure from Marx is further illustrated by Aron’s nuanced position on
determinism and probabilism in history. While refusing to admit that forces of production
determine history, he acknowledged the importance of ideas, forces of production,
and contingency in determining the course of history. He did not think that this question
permits a precise response, but pointed out that the story of mankind is an unfinished
and unpredictable one. Every political situation, argued Aron, “always allows for a margin
of choice, but the margin is never unlimited”38. Hence, he went on, political theorists
should attempt to elucidate the goals that societies should pursue as well as the means
that they have at their disposal. But they ought to investigate the realm of the possible
by also taking into account prior goals, preferences, and principles. To study these goals
in a vacuum, concluded Aron, would be absurd because ideas arise out of specific political,
cultural, social, and economic contexts that always limit the range of the possible.
Another example of Aron’s political judgment was the highly controversial episode
of the Algerian independence. This issue had polarized the entire French public opinion
and generated sentimental and violent reactions that often made dialogue difficult if
not utterly impossible. Aron recognized early on that denying Algeria’s independence
would be both morally illegitimate and economically unfeasible. Although he was not
blind to moral considerations, he defended Algeria’s independence on economic
rather than moral grounds, without professing loudly his love for humanity or his
defense of the independence of the Third World as many others did. Aron foresaw
37 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 41.
38 Aron, Politics and History, p. 237.
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that denying the independence of Algeria would have involved a military and
economic commitment that France was unable to sustain at that point in time (the whole
decade of the 1950s marked the decline of France’s military power). On this topic as
on many others, Aron preferred to think politically rather than in moral terms and
resorted to an ethics of responsibility rather than one of absolute ends. He had a clear
sense of proportions: “I based my policy on reality. … The policy that I recommended
could just as easily have been based on moral principles, because they were compatible. …
My purpose was to analyze a political problem in order to demonstrate that a given
solution was the least bad. … the avoidance of a national tragedy, that is, a civil war,
depended upon the courage of the politicians39.
The same “politics of understanding” underlay Aron’s realist position toward the
Munich accords of 1938 and the students’ revolts of 1968. While acknowledging that the
Munich accords were not honorable, he argued that in terms of Realpolitik it is open to
discussion whether the opposite approach would have saved lives given Hitler’s personal
irrational agenda and the balance of power in Europe in the late 1930s. “In any case,”
opined Aron, “it seems to me unjust and egregious to make a clear-cut distinction between
good people and bad people, according to whether they were for or against Munich”40. The
turbulent events of May 1968 in Paris showed another face of Aron, the trimmer, concerned
with keeping the ship on an even keel in times of social and political unrest41. Aron found
himself isolated between the two camps with which he had strong disagreements, but he
realized that the students’ revolutionary fervor fueled the discontent of the Parisian
workers (who launched a massive strike following the student’s demonstrations) and was
thus threatening the very foundations of the French Republic. Although Aron’s relations
with Charles de Gaulle were notoriously ambiguous and tense, during the final week of
May 1968 he declared his support for the President when the survival of the regime was
threatened by the most radical demonstrators. Aron also rejected the radicalism of Sartre
as illustrated by his famous claim that the President had launched a “call for murder”42.
39 Aron, Thinking Politically, pp. 162; 164-66; also see pp 170-71. For an analysis of this issue, see Tony Judt,
“Introduction,” in Aron, The Dawn of Universal History, pp. xvii-xx.
40 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 51.
41 The classical definition of the “trimmer” was given by Halifax in The Character of a Trimmer: “This innocent
word Trimmer signifieth no more than this: That if Men are together in a boat, and one par of the company
would weigh it down on one side, another would make it lean as much to he contrary; it happeneth there
is a third Opinion of those, who conceive it would do as well, if the Boat went even, without endangering
the passengers” (Halifax, Complete Works, ed. J. P. Kenyon [London: Penguin, 1969], p. 50).
42 See Aron, Memoirs, pp. 326-28 and Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 209.
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Aron commented ironically: “Not even a vulgar demagogue would have used such an
expression in reference to General de Gaulle, to a government that had tolerated the
‘demos,’ the semi-riots that had gone day by day”43.
Aron adopted a similar trimming attitude afterwards when he was invited to comment
on the governance of the universities. “Whenever I discussed the future or questions of
reform at university meetings,” remembered Aron, “I was always on the side of the
reformers. But as soon as I saw that honorable and decent teachers were being treated in
a shabby manner, I defended them. I didn’t agree with them, but I defended them”44. In
spite of his outright rejection of the violent means chosen by demonstrators, Aron
acknowledged that the pseudo-revolution of May 1968 also had a few positive unintended
effects. French society became more aware of the problems created by low wages,
universities were granted greater autonomy, and the predominant views about economic
growth were revised.
The solitary center
Aron’s moderation marginalized him in the middle and his balanced and detached
position irritated sensibilities on both ends of the political spectrum. He once described
himself as “a man without party, who is all the more unbearable because he takes his
moderation to excess and hides his passions under his arguments”45. To be sure, Aron paid
a lot of attention to the ideas of those who opposed his principles (Sartre was the most
famous example). Seeking to promote empathy for others’ points of view, Aron attempted
to make people understand that those who disagreed with them were not necessarily
enemies or traitors. Yet, he was far from successful in this regard. As Aron himself
acknowledged, he found himself once again isolated, the usual destiny of an authentic
liberal (in the European sense of the word). This was a paradoxical situation, because he
spent his entire life going to the Left, while speaking the language of the Right, and going
43 Aron, Memoirs, p. 327.
44 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 215.
45 The phrase is from Aron’s speech on the occasion of his admission to the Institute (Academy of Moral and
Political Sciences) in 1965 (apud Baverez, Raymond Aron, p. 338). Also see the following statement of Aron:
“My passion for analysis has led me to criticize almost everyone in politics, even including those who, in
general terms, think as I do. … Oddly enough, although I write in moderate terms, it frequently happens
that I do so in a wounding way or at least in a way considered irritating“ (Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 301).
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to the Right, while speaking the language of the Left46. Sometimes, for example on
the Algerian war, Aron’s positions were closer to the Left than to the Right. On Stalinism,
he was seen as a man of the Right because he denounced Stalinism and communism
in unambiguous terms.
Aron saw himself as an intellectual of a rather peculiar breed and one could say,
paraphrasing Tocqueville, that the liberal party to which he belonged did not exist during
this time47. Aron was rarely in agreement with those he had voted for and the best example
was his uneasy relation with Charles de Gaulle. While sharing with the latter the same
strong commitment to the values of the French Republic, Aron never became a Gaullist,
a confidante of the General upon whom the latter could always rely. Aron went so far
as to criticize on more than one occasion what he called a certain form of “Gaullist
fanaticism” that went against the main principles of his own philosophy. “To be truly
Gaullist,” claimed Aron, “it was necessary to have faith in de Gaulle and to be ready
to change one’s opinions to agree with his. I could not do it, but that didn’t prevent me
from being André Malraux’s directeur de cabinet”48.
Under the Fifth Republic, Aron’s attitude toward de Gaulle was defined by the
principle “Solidarity in times of crisis and independence in normal times.” While in Aron’s
view de Gaulle’s foreign policy—”la politique du joyeux célibataire international,” to use
Pierre Hassner’s words49 – was sometimes unnecessarily provocative, its main initiatives
were in line with the general interests of the French Republic and the free world. At the
time of the Liberation, noted Aron, General de Gaulle’s government was “much the best
and … it was necessary to support it.” A decade later, de Gaulle’s return to power, “even
though the circumstances were unpleasant, was rather desirable”50 because, thanks to
46 See Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 257. The same point was made by a friend of Sartre and critic of Aron,
Michel Contat, in an article published in Le Monde in 1980: “[Aron] still belongs to the family of the left,
and, in a certain sense, this has always been true, even when he joined the opposition, because his arguments
are always directed to the left, as though he wanted to remove their blinders” (quoted in Aron, Memoirs,
p. 460).
47 It is not a mere coincidence that Aron was responsible for the revival of interest in Tocqueville in France in
the 1950s. For more details, see the chapter on Tocqueville published in Raymond Aron, Main Currents in
Sociological Thought, Vol. I, eds. Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian Anderson (New Brunswick: Transactions,
1998), pp. 237-302.
48 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 101.
49 Pierre Hassner’s words were quoted by Pierre Manent in a recent dialogue with Nicolas Baverez, “Raymond
Aron, le dernier philosophe des Lumières,” published in Le Figaro, October 17, 2003 on the occasion of two
decades from Aron’s death.
50 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 101.
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his prestige, he had a better chance than anyone else to find a solution to the Algerian crisis.
As the latter degenerated, the General “had dirtied his hands as little as possible”51.
Moreover, de Gaulle wished to and fought hard to restore a democratic republic, even if
his constitutional plan gave the President the opportunity “to exercise an absolute and
limited power”52. In Aron’s view, he was “a perfect example of the charismatic leader who
had “historic ambitions comparable to those of Washington”53. In an article published on
the first anniversary of de Gaulle’ return to power, Aron concluded: “The Fifth Republic
exists, and in present-day France, General de Gaulle is the best possible monarch in the
least bad of possible governments. He possesses personal power, but he restored the
Republic in 1945. He manipulated the 1958 revolution in order to produce an authoritarian
republic, not fascism nor a military despotism. He wants to save the remnants of the French
empire, but he has granted the territories of black Africa the right to independence”54.
If Aron was a moderate of a peculiar breed with a keen sense of intellectual and
political independence, he took, however, a firm and clear stance on all the great questions
of his time: Fascism, the Soviet Union, decolonization, Algeria, May 1968, the role of the
United States in the world, and the famous press conference of de Gaulle on the Jews from
1967 in which he described the Jews as “an elite people, sure of itself and overbearing.”
That on all these issues Aron was more or less “right” is certainly remarkable given not
only the complex nature of political events but also the number of brilliant intellectuals
who chose to defend the indefensible (the crimes of Communism). But it would be even
more important to try to understand how Aron arrived at his conclusions, what enabled
him to take a correct stance when others seemingly failed to do so. To make him an
infallible judge would certainly be absurd and would moreover contradict the spirit in
which Aron himself conducted his entire public life. At the same time, it would be difficult
to deny that he was a far more reliable judge of modern politics and society than Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, Kojève, Foucault, and other famous philosophic and literary figures.
Aron’s moderation and lucid political judgment played a key role in this regard. He
constantly affirmed the superiority of free society over any form of totalitarianism and
chose the “preferable” over the “detestable.” When really great issues were at stake, when
situations arose in which, politically or existentially, it was vital to be on one side or the
51 Aron, Memoirs, p. 255.
52 Ibid., p. 256. The phrase is taken from an article of Aron in which he commented on de Gaulle’s
constitutional plans. The expression “absolute and limited” comes from Maurras.
53 Ibid., p. 258.
54 Ibid., p. 258.
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other, Aron took a firm and lucid stance. His reasoning was surprisingly simple,
unencumbered by futile existential anxieties that plagued Sartre’s political works:
“I have chosen the society that accepts dialogue,” remarked Aron. “As far as possible,
this dialogue must be reasonable; but it accepts unleashed emotions, it accepts irrationality.
… The other society is founded on the refusal to have confidence in those governed,
founded also on the pretension of a minority of oligarchs that they possess the definitive
truth for themselves and for the future. I detest that; I have fought it for thirty-five years
and I will continue to do so. The pretension of those few oligarchs to possess the truth of
history and of the future is intolerable”55. He could have never have said, with
Merleau-Ponty, that “there is as much ‘existentialism’ in the stenographic record of the
Moscow debates as in all of the works of Koestler.” Nor could Aron have ever affirmed,
with Francis Jeanson (speaking for Sartre against Camus) that “we are simultaneously
against [Soviet Union] and for it”56. Aron was unwilling to gloss over the fact that in the
name of lofty ideals millions of people were sent to concentrations camps or left to starve.
In his eyes, one had to either break with communism or embrace its ideology: tertium non
datur.
Aron’s analysis of the major political events of his time shows that he did not
take refuge behind cold or neutral concepts even if, as he once put it, he sometimes
took his moderation to excess and hid his passions under his arguments. Instead, he
analyzed each situation with a mixture of calm attachment and detachment, reason
and passion, without giving arrogant advice of the sort “Let me tell you what you
should do.” He was aware of his own fallibility and limited knowledge and considered
himself a well-informed amateur who did not feel obliged to tell others what they
should think or do. As an editorialist for Le Figaro for thirty years, he believed that a
well-informed journalist must not seek to indoctrinate his readers, but ought to give
them at least the basic facts the ministers should also use in making their decisions.
When appropriate, he shared with his readers his own beliefs, but he did it with his
characteristic “icy clarity”57 and detached attachment. Last but not least, he realized
that he did not possess the qualities necessary to exercise power or to advise princes.
Prudent in his writings, he had a difficult time controlling his speech and often
found himself incapable of adopting a neutral diplomatic language. What Aron lacked
55 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 252.
56 Aron’s reference to Merleau-Ponty can be found in Aron, Memoirs, p. 215; for his critique of Jeanson’s
ambiguous position, see p. 221.
57 I borrow this phrase from Judt’s The Burden of Responsibility.
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was a certain capacity for performance that he acknowledged as an important
prerequisite of success in politics. As he put it in his memoirs, “Intelligence, knowledge,
and judgment are not enough. Performance is also required, of which I would have
been most probably incapable”58. But is it possible for a committed observer to
“perform” in a moderate manner in politics and public life?
The committed observer
This question prompt us to ask what would be the “right type of intelligence”
or the proper mindset of the committed observer that makes one capable of correctly
understanding the fundamental antinomies and constraints of political life. Such a
person would have to be aware of the general trends of his time and would refuse the
temptation to judge absolutely and unconditionally, a position that suits better the
prophet than the committed observer. The latter seeks to understand the complexity
of political and social phenomena by cherishing it rather than seeking to ignore it
or simplify it. The committed observer attempts “to disintoxicate minds and to calm
fanaticism, even when it is against the current tendency”59. While being aware of
the importance of passions, he continues to believe in the power of reason and works
to make reasonableness and lucidity triumph even in the midst of terrible events. As
such, he is convinced that when it comes to analyzing political phenomena, one
must divest oneself of any sentimentality and should strive to be as lucid as possible60.
As such, to borrow Weber’s famous dichotomy, the committed observer prefers
the ethics of responsibility to the ethics of conviction, or to use Aron’s own words, he
engages in the “politics of understanding” as opposed to the “politics of Reason” (with “R”).
This is not to say that the committed observer distrusts reason per se or that he no
longer believes in the power of rational inquiry. While acknowledging the virtues of
reason, the committed observer resists the temptation of idolizing Reason. His goal is
to maximize the presence of reason and moderation in a world dominated by human
passions, cruelty, and an eternal competition for scarce resources. The engaged spectator
understands that politics involves the inevitable exercise of power for maintaining
58 Aron, Memoirs, p. 476.
59 The phrase belongs to Camus and is taken from Albert Camus, The Plague (New York: Modern Library,
1974), p. 121.
60 For more details, see Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 262.
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order and security, with all its ensuing risks and costly choices made in an environment
fraught with uncertainty and in constant flux. Because he refuses to think of politics as a
means of implementing radical reforms or changing human nature, he shuns the idea
of government or any one single agency being the chief agent in the pursuit of perfection.
Improvement and perfection mean, however, two different things and, as already
mentioned, Aron’s position was in fact compatible with support of incremental reform61.
Like Dr. Rieux in Camus’ The Plague, the committed observer (as described by
Aron) is inclined to say: “Salvation is just too big a word for me. I don’t aim so high.
I’m concerned with man’s health; for me, his health comes first”62. His position is
characterized by a fundamental modesty that teaches him a sound order of priorities.
He seeks to help his fellow citizens understand better their political environment
and is committed to “truth and liberty, the love of truth and the horror of lies”63. If the
committed observer is somewhat detached from the actual game of politics, his is a form
of detached attachment because, as Aron points out, he loves his country and puts
the survival and security of the community above everything else. That is why when
the danger of civil war looms large he does everything in his power to avoid the worst64.
But, while understanding the importance of order and social peace, the committed
observer also grasps that “there is a barbarism of order no less to be avoided than
the barbarism of disorder”65. He distrusts not only those anarchists who fail to understand
the necessary prerequisites of political life in modern society, but also those who praise
order only because their view of the world is too narrow.
Above all, the engaged spectator refuses the posture of a seer or prophet. His is not a
politics of faith, but, to use Michael Oakeshott’s dichotomy, one of skepticism. Those who
espouse the politics of faith understand the activity of governing as instrumental
in achieving the perfection of social and political order and have almost unlimited
confidence in human reason. On the contrary, the proponents of the politics of skepticism
61 On this issue, also see Michael Oakeshott The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism, ed. Timothy
Fuller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 53. It is worth pointing out that in this respect Aron’s
liberalism was different from Oakeshott’s more conservative stance. Yet, they both shared a certain
skepticism that made them immune to any forms of political radicalism.
62 Camus, The Plague, p. 17.
63 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 261.
64 See, for example, the following statement of Aron: “As always in the most difficult situations, I try to find
a way to avoid the worst – and the worst thing that can happen to a country, as far as I am concerned, is
civil war. … I was always obsessed with the need to avoid civil war, and I lived in an era when we were
always close to it” (ibid., p. 74).
65 I borrow here a phrase from Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism, p. 35.
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view the activity of governing as detached from the pursuit of perfection in this world
and claim that the most important aim of politics is to reduce as much as possible the
intensity of conflict in the world. This explains why Aron’s committed observer does
not have the pretension of knowing the future, nor does he claim to know the direction
in which mankind will inevitably evolve. He only has a certain imperfect understanding
of reality without ever pretending to fully understand it. He tries to remain as close
as possible to the facts themselves for fear of being carried away from them and losing
sight of reality. He accepts that both the world and the vocabulary with which we try
to make sense of it are essentially and irreducibly ambiguous, heterogeneous, and
infinitely complex, susceptible of various interpretations.
Hence, the committed observer views with skepticism the initiatives of those
who embrace the ethics of absolute ends, who claim to have a clear and infallible
knowledge of the future, and make their decisions based on this final station and on
what they think necessary to attain this distant goal. Working with a simplified
Manichean view of politics, the enthusiast partisans of the politics of faith see themselves
as confidants of Providence and have the illusion of knowing the denouement of the
drama of history. The committed observer rejects these ambitious claims because he
is skeptical toward any vision of politics that has a messianic or soteriological ring.
His commitment, however, is of a particular nature that deserves special attention.
To be true to his vocation as spectateur engagé he needs both knowledge and judgment,
that is to say “knowledge of the polarity of the politics within which he moves, and
judgment to recognize the proper occasions and directions of movement”66. While being
aware of the limits within which one can be at once an objective spectator and an effective
actor, the engaged observer believes that objectivity is not at all incompatible with
commitment to a set of principles and values67. He realizes, however, that these values
and principles do not always form a harmonious whole. Hence, what distinguishes
his position from that of the romantic type is the ability to grasp and to correctly interpret
the antimonies at the heart of human condition and modern society, the inescapable
trade-offs that people face in their daily lives. The committed observer distrusts simplicity
as well as any attempt to reduce the complexity of social world to a few basic
66 Ibid., p. 124.
67 Here is a revealing passage from Aron: “I had decided to be a committed observer. To be at one and the same
time the observer of history as it was unfolding, to try to be as objective as possible regarding that history,
and to be not totally detached from it – in other words, to be committed. I wanted to combine the dual role
of actor and spectator” (Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 257).
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elements that would fit our black-and-white categories and concepts. In order to
grasp the inevitable constraints of social and political world, he studies not only the
ideas, choices, and actions of real political actors but also the institutions that shape
and limit their actions. He acknowledges that “when one analyzes present-day societies,
one is so aware of the constraints that weigh as much on those who govern as on
those governed that it is difficult to dream or invent as you suggest”68.
Hence, when acting in an environment that does not fit his categories and concepts,
the committed observer does not seek refuge in the comfort of an imaginary perfect
society. He is not bothered by the nuances of gray that characterize the political sphere;
on the contrary, he believes that gray, too, can be beautiful under certain circumstances.
That is why he does not aspire to angelic purity69 and does not dream of building a
world purified of all traces of impurity or evil. He acknowledges that the relationship
between politics and morality is a notoriously difficult one that cannot be properly
studied by borrowing and applying concepts from ethics in a rigorous manner.
Moreover, he admits that even “political thought is essentially impure, equivocal”70 and
must remain so. Because politics involves constraint and a certain level of violence,
it combines elements of morality and immorality in such a way that it makes often
difficult to apply an unambiguous criterion for deciding upon the best course of
action. Hence, the committed observer admits that political activity is by nature
impure and cannot always be judged against the precepts of Christian morality; in
other words, “politics is not coterminous with the activities of good Samaritans”71.
Above all, the engaged spectator as described by Aron is aware that “politics is never
a conflict between good and evil, but always a choice between the preferable and the
detestable”72. That is why he rejects perfectionism in unambiguous terms: “In political
affairs, it is impossible to demonstrate truth, but one can try, on the basis of what
one knows, to make sensible decisions”73. He recognizes that in times of great
misfortunes, even truth may be “prosaic and insufferable”74. Sometimes, he is not
afraid of relying on intuition rather than on incontestable facts75. He does not ask
68 Ibid., p. 251.
69 “I have never aspired to angelic purity, otherwise I have renounced studying political matters” (ibid., p. 242).
70 The phrase is taken from Aron, Politics and History, p. 237.
71 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 244; also see p. 33.
72 Ibid., p. 242.
73 Ibid., p. 264.
74 Ibid., p. 82.
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which ideology is appropriate in each case, but ponders what should one do to save the
state from ruin if one were at the helm of the state. He refuses to think in terms of
black-and-white categories and does not see the world through ideological blinders
that inevitably end up distorting the facts themselves. On the contrary, he prefers to
explain reality and its contradictory facts rather than reinvent them. Respect for facts
is a supreme value for the committed observer. In the name of realism, he rejects
cheap tirades of indignation and vituperation that might cloud or affect his perception
of reality. His reasoning is simple and straightforward: if a political system causes
in reality the suffering of millions of individuals, this is an undeniable fact that
unambiguously condemns it in the face of history.
Despite his image as a hesitant spirit, the engaged spectator (again, as described
by Aron) is capable, however, of espousing firm positions and making clear decisions.
He is not neutral when neutrality is inappropriate and is not afraid of recommending
tough measures when circumstances require them. But he is not likely to rush to act even
when he has the determination to see and to seize upon truth and reality. While being
aware that “to think politically in a society one must make a fundamental choice”76, his
motto remains “neither Dionysius nor Apollo, but each in his place and season”77. In
other words, although his judgment closely follows specific events, it is not entirely
driven by them. On the contrary, it is integrated into a larger vision that ensures that
his choices are based not on wishful thinking, but on a realistic assessment of each
particular situation. He has the ambition to form his own viewpoint on the main issues of
the day and refuses to embrace the ideas held by others without first questioning their
accuracy.
It is the almost religious respect for facts that explains why the committed observer
is neither a political activist nor a moralist. He does not find difficult to accept that
other people’s arguments are as plausible as his own opinions and refuses to believe
that those who disagree with him do not have a moral stance worth respecting. But
the engaged spectator is not a mere pragmatist either. If he pays due respect to facts,
he does not idolize them either. Moreover, he does not believe that political action is a
mere game or an arena for expressing personal preferences and choices that are
equally valuable. His tone is often sharp and critical. He does not shy away from
75 See ibid., p. 267.
76 Ibid., p. 44.
77 I borrow this phrase from Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism, p. 124.
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criticizing those in power when making serious mistakes, nor is he reluctant to
criticize those in opposition when they are in error. Nonetheless, he has the unfair
reputation for being someone who analyzes and dissects facts (ad nauseam) with an
icy clarity and “dramatic dryness,” that is to say someone who does not take sides
and rarely puts forward helpful solutions78.
Finally, the committed observer refuses to overemphasize that politics is Manichean.
He is aware that nothing is so evil that it does not contain some good, just as nothing
is so good that it does not contain some evil. No choice is clear, perfect, or cost-free,
and every decision requires careful thinking and evaluation of alternative paths. That
is why his sober style does not seek for cheap rhetorical victories and retains a
certain decency of expression that prevents him from being carried away by temporary
emotions that he would later regret. His conduct is guided by the belief that it is
neither his habit nor his duty to make strong moral judgments of other people, even
if he is allowed to register his moral disagreement with their ideas and principles.
What is of paramount importance is that the committed observer as described by
Aron refuses to consider himself a moral authority entitled to give lessons to his fellow
citizens. His rejection of any moral posturing is also motivated by his own self-doubt
and self-questioning that are the sources of his modesty. While acknowledging the need
for difficult and costly trade-offs in politics, he is perfectly aware that there are
rarely heroes on one side and villains on the other. Because he believes that there
has always been in politics a mixture of heroism and cruelty, saints and monsters,
progress and reaction, reason and passions, he seeks to work with what is given rather
than attempting to reform the world according to a utopian or perfectionist blueprint.
As a moderate, the engaged spectator understands and accepts that liberal democracy
is by nature an “eternal imperfection, a mixture of sinfulness, saintliness, and monkey
business”79, a regime that, in spite of its patent shortcomings, is capable of improvement
and needs constant nurturing. Furthermore, the moderate committed observer does
not believe in the existence of a general sense of history, yet he retains a certain degree
of optimism and believes that there still remains a certain degree of maneuver and
liberty even in the face of adverse circumstances. He accepts the fact that there is no
78 A phrase from Aron’s dialogue with Wolton is revealing in this regard. “You make choices,” argued Wolton,
“but you give the impression of not adhering to them” (Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 81). I borrow the
phrase “dramatic dryness” from Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, p. 344.
79 I borrow the phrase from Adam Michnik, Letters from Freedom (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1998), p, 326. On this issue, also see Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 263.
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progress without a negative side and seeks to give due consideration to both the bright
and dark sides of progress, while remaining a moderate and unbiased advocate of
piecemeal reform.
More importantly, the committed observer does not deduce the desirable solutions
from a body of first principles laid down once and forever. Instead, he applies discretion
and considers each problem separately, step by step, taking inspiration sometimes
from history, sometimes from theory, experience, and the discussions with his fellow
citizens80. Sound political judgment requires the capacity to understand the unique
nature of political phenomena and actors’ intentions. The committed observer knows
that it is a great error to speak of political things “absolutely and indiscriminately and
to deal with them, as it were, by the book”81. Instead, he insists that in nearly all things
one must make prudent distinctions and exceptions because circumstances change
and new circumstances always require new approaches. To judge by the book would
amount to a serious misunderstanding of political life, because every tiny difference
in each case always has significant, large-scale effects. Or, to discern these small differences
requires a perspicacious eye and sound discernment, since political affairs cannot
be judged from an Archimedian point away from the sound and fury of the world,
but ought to be resolved and considered day by day, step by step, here and now.
An Aronian school of moderation?
By examining Aron’s writings we have seen a moderate mind at work navigating
prudently between the ideological temptations of his times. Starting from the assumption
that politics is rarely to be described in Manichean terms, Aron understood that
political life is characterized by choices between what is preferable and what is
detestable rather than between good and evil. In this regard, he was a much more reliable
political guide than many of his contemporaries who embraced various forms of political
radicalism and succumbed all too easily to the charming songs of sirens, left or right.
Aron’s writings contain important reflections on the chief task of the political philosopher
in modern society. By remaining nonpartisan, he must seek to moderate the always
overheated and biased positions of political actors and must do his best to prevent
80 See Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 303.
81 Guicciardini, Maxims and Reflexions, p. 42.
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the outbreak of civil war. Through his own moderation and balanced judgment, he
must also attempt to contribute to the civic education of his fellow citizens, as was the
case with ancient political philosophers82. A responsible political philosopher does
not always have the possibility of acting efficiently, but he is always expected to speak
out against injustice in unambiguous terms:
Whether he meditates on the world or engages in action, whether he teaches
obedience to laws or respect for authentic values, whether he urges revolt or
encourages persistent effort toward reform, the philosopher fulfills his calling
inside and outside of the polity, sharing the risks but not the illusions of his chosen
party. He would cease to deserve the name of philosopher only on the day that he
came to share the fanaticism or skepticism of ideologues, the day he subscribed to
inquisition by theologian-judges. No one can blame him for using the language of
those in power if it is the price of his survival. … But if he turns away from the
search for truth or encourages the mindless to believe that they hold the ultimate
truth, then he abjures his calling. The philosopher no longer exists – only the
technician or the ideologue83.
In many ways, this passage accounts for Aron’s own intellectual trajectory that, in
turn, leads us to ask if there is there a school of moderation and if moderates,
marginalized in the middle, can ever have disciples. At first glance, one might argue
that there is no Aronian school of thought. It will be recalled that many Frenchmen
believed that it was better to be wrong with Sartre than right with Aron. As Nicolas
Baverez pointed out, there is no doctrine associated with Aron’s name84, a fact
confirmed by Aron himself. “In adopting certain positions,” he once said, “I have
been a man very much alone in the face of history”85. His intellectual trajectory
shows that the practice of moderation can lead to a peculiar form of exile. Yet,
although the moderate is not destined to be the leader of any sect, he is perhaps in
the best position to teach us how to love freedom and democracy well. This point
82 For a classical view, see Strauss’ essay “On Classical Political Philosophy,” in Leo Strauss, An Introduction
to Political Philosophy. Ten Essays by Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1989), pp. 59-80.
83 Aron, Politics and History, p. 259.
84 Nicolas Baverez and Pierre Manent, “Raymond Aron, le dernier philosophe des Lumières,” published in Le
Figaro, October 17, 2003.
85 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 253.
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was clearly made by Etienne Mantout who once told Aron: “You have shown us …
that one can admire democracy without failing to recognize its faults, that one
can love liberty without being sentimental, and that ‘he who loves well punishes
well’”86. Yet, it is undeniable that Aron’s ideas influenced an important number of
friends and disciples who had subsequently risen to positions of political prominence
in France87. The fact that political luminaries such as Henry Kissinger and Charles
de Gaulle paid heed to Aron’s analyses is another proof of the enduring significance
of his works.
Aron was aware of the antinomies, paradoxes and tragic choices in politics and
understood that some conflicts are irreconcilable, require firm decisions, and may
sometimes have tragic and unintended consequences. Among the clearly identifiable
features of Aron’s moderation are: reason, prudence, perceptive understanding of the
antinomies88 of the political sphere, rejection of political prophecy, opposition to
determinism, and a distrust of any form of moral posturing. The committed observer
strives to have a good knowledge of history, grasps the irreducibly complex nature
of politics, and is aware not only of the tragic nature of political events but also
of the inevitable plurality of social, moral, and political values and goods. The
ideal proposed by the Aronian tradition of moderation is the political philosopher
who understands well the seminal role played by passions in politics and is convinced
that “to reflect upon politics, one must be as rational as possible, but to be active
in them, one must inevitably play upon the emotions of other men”89. He also has
the ability to understand the way others think because, as a critical thinker, he
remains independent and detached. As such, Aronian skepticism designates a
form of philosophical reflection on politics that does not let the intellectuals’
characteristic romantic (or utopian) attitude toward politics to get the better of their
sense of reality.
To conclude, it is Aron’s moderation that makes him relevant today, in an eclectic
age when doctrines and ideas are again mixed, after having lost their previous sharp
86 Ibid., p. 346.
87 The creation of the Raymond Aron Center of Political Research at the prestigious École des Hautes Études
en Sciences Sociales in Paris illustrates the enduring influence of Aron’s works. This institution has been at
the center of the “new French thought” in the 1980s. Among the best known representatives of this trend
are Pierre Manent, Alain Besançon, Pierre Rosanvallon, and Marcel Gauchet.
88 On this issue, see Anderson, Raymond Aron, pp. 139, 170-72.
89 Aron, Thinking Politically, p. 33.
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contours and identities. The age of extremes, one can hope, is over, and with it also
disappears the notion of politics as the pursuit of certainty. The principles of liberal
democracy properly understood can immunize the body politic against the seductions
of perfectionism and the tyranny of abstractions in politics. Yet, because of their many
imperfections, to love liberty and democracy well or, to put it differently, to fall in
love with the subtle beauty of gray, is no easy task. It demands not only passion, but
also moderation and prudence. Modern society, Aron once argued, must be analyzed
and appreciated for what it is worth, without unjustified of enthusiasm or utter
indignation that would affect one’s vision and understanding. If Raymond Aron’s
works are of interest to today’s readers, it is because of his belief that one must remain
constantly vigilant to limit the intensity of political conflict and to preserve and
nurture the pluralism of ideas, principles, and interests that are essential to freedom
in modern society.
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